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The Education of a Non-Career Political Ambassador
Max M. Kampelman*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article is not a primer for those who aspire to a career in diplomacy. It
is instead a report by a lawyer-political scientist who was called out of private
life and into public service. It is not unusual in our country for American
ambassadors to be selected from private life. Indeed, there is a continuing
competition underway between the State Department, which looks to advance
the careers of its professionals, and the White House, which seeks to reward the
President's supporters and friends.
I was appointed in 1980 by President Jimmy Carter, and later reappointed
by President Ronald Reagan, to serve as a United States ambassador and
negotiator for the Madrid meeting of the thirty-five nation Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE").' The Madrid meeting was
convened in 1980 under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act, an agreement
signed in 1975.2 I was informed that the meeting would last two to three
months. It lasted three years. A previous CSCE meeting in Belgrade in 1977
ended in short order without an agreement and after much internal strife.3 The
Madrid meeting ended with an agreement that strengthened Europe's
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commitment to human rights, and was considered by many European leaders as
the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATING WITH CONGRESS
Soon after my appointment, I learned that an influential Congressional
Joint Commission had been formed which did not trust the State Department's
commitment to the human rights provisions in the Helsinki document. I
arranged to visit the Commission Chairman, Representative Dante Fascell,
whom I knew. By then, I learned that his staff had a significant grasp of the
details of the agreement, more so than the people at State who kept rotating
from job to job every few years.
I told Representative Fascell that I wanted to include his people on our
delegation staff. He agreed, if I would select his staff director as my deputy. I
had earlier decided upon Warren Zimmerman, a career diplomat (later to
become our last ambassador to Yugoslavia), to serve as deputy. I explained to
Representative Fascell that I felt our deputy should be a career foreign service
officer with access to the State Department and a familiarity with its methods.
Representative Fascell's staff director therefore became our number three
person. I also asked Representative Fascell to serve as Vice Chairman of our
delegation, along with his colleague, Senator Claiborne Pell.4
Our delegation's intimacy with Congress worked extremely well. Involving
the Congressmen as observers in our negotiations when they were in Madrid
meant that, at the conclusion of the three-year meeting, I had no problem
persuading the Congress that we had done a good job of representing the
national interest of the United States.
Similarly, President Reagan, who in 1985 asked me to return to
government service as our chief negotiator with the Soviet Union in Geneva on
nuclear arms reductions and missile defense, authorized me to negotiate a
Congressional "observer" plan with the leadership of the Senate and the House.
These bipartisan members of Congress took the lead in persuading their
colleagues that our Geneva agreements with the Soviets were in our national
interest. The two treaties we negotiated there, which for the first time reduced
our long-range nuclear missiles by 50 percent and totally eliminated all of the
intermediate range missiles that were in our arsenals, were easily ratified.

III. BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS
The Madrid meeting began with a preparatory session in September 1980.
We had no diplomatic contact of any kind with the Soviet Union after the
Cooperation within the US diplomatic community is also important to a successful
delegation.
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Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. On my first day in Madrid, I had
arranged to have lunch with the Romanian ambassador, whom I met during his
brief visit to Washington and who spoke English. At the end of the lunch, he
said that he had to tell "uncle" about our meeting. I told him that I assumed he
would be required to keep the Soviets informed. That afternoon, he called to say
that the head of the Soviet delegation, who was also the ambassador to Spain,
wondered whether he and I could meet. I agreed, much to his surprise, and
suggested we meet for lunch the next day wherever he chose. A bit later that
afternoon, a chagrined Romanian called to say that the Russian wanted me to
choose the location. I explained that I had just arrived that morning and did not
know the city or its restaurants, but that the Russian obviously wanted it to
appear that the initiative for the lunch was mine rather than his. "Fine," I said.
"Let's make it at my hotel apartment."
Warren and I met with him and his number two in command, a KGB
general, who spoke English. Our meeting lasted for three hours. The general
called Warren that evening to suggest we meet again the next evening. I asked
Warren to inform him that the Jewish high holidays began the next evening, and
that I would be at the synagogue, but would be pleased to meet again after the
holidays. The opportunity to make this point about my Jewish heritage pleased
me, and it made the rounds of the delegations.
The meeting we had with the Soviets served another purpose. I had learned
that at the prior review meeting held in Belgrade in 1977, the NATO caucus was
divided. We wanted the NATO caucus in Madrid to exist and to be effective.
Warren knew the head of the United Kingdom delegation. Our British friend
doubted the French would agree to an active NATO caucus, but he offered to
initiate an opening meeting at his mission, pointing out that the United States
followed alphabetically and could call for a second meeting, although he did not
expect the French to accept our invitation.
During the first meeting at the British embassy, I informed our allies that I
had responded to a Soviet initiative and had agreed to have lunch with the
Soviets the next day. If, however, our NATO friends thought it unwise for us to
meet, I would cancel the lunch. They urged me to attend. I then announced that,
since the US followed the UK alphabetically, I would invite them to a second
NATO caucus at the US embassy the next afternoon, at which I would report
on our meeting with the Soviets. They agreed, and the French attended the
meeting, as I suspected they would. Some days thereafter, I approached the very
capable French ambassador, who spoke English well, and he unexpectedly
agreed, given my inability to speak his language, to speak English and not
French at the NATO caucus meetings. We were clearly on our way to becoming,
and in fact remained, a solid NATO caucus, plus Spain. Spain was not a member
of NATO at the time, but Spain's membership in our caucus was later followed
by Spain's entry into NATO at Brussels.
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IV. TAKING A STRONG STAND AGAINST SOVIET OPPRESSION
One of the divisive issues in the prior Belgrade meeting had to do with the
US decision to name Soviet victims of oppression. Our allies would not join us.
My Madrid instructions, and indeed my strong wishes, were to name names.
When I explained our intention to the Germans, I was informed that they had
obtained the release of fifty thousand Germans from the Soviet Union the
previous year and had done so quietly. They did not intend to change their
approach. I stated that I did not want to be party to any approach that would
keep even a single German in the Soviet Union who might otherwise have been
released, but I said that we must work like an orchestra. Sometimes the piano is
quiet, and sometimes it is loud. The flute is always soft. The drummers and the
saxophones are louder. The important task is to make music together. This was
passed on to the foreign minister, Mr. Genscher, who frequently referred to that
analogy in his meetings with me.
In that same vein, before the Madrid formal meeting began in November, I
told the Swedish ambassador that I intended to raise the name of Raoul
Wallenberg, a Swedish citizen captured and imprisoned by the Soviets for his
work in saving the lives of Jewish refugees. I explained that although I did not
wish to embarrass the Swedish delegation, the US Congress had made Mr.
Wallenberg an honorary American citizen. He appreciated the information and
said that he would pass it along to his foreign minister. The Swedish minister
referred to the Wallenberg case in his statement on the opening day. His was the
first delegation to name names. By the end of the Madrid meeting, it is my
recollection that more than twenty of the thirty-five countries mentioned the
names of victims of Soviet oppression, and it is my recollection that the US
mentioned more than two hundred names, many of whom were released from
prison and permitted to emigrate as we ended our three year meeting. The scars
of the Belgrade tensions disappeared.
I had been advised by a State Department official that I would be provided
a suggested draft of my opening remarks for the Madrid session. It did not
arrive. With one day to go, I became anxious, summoned my secretary, and
dictated the speech I wanted to give. It was a tough speech, with an emphasis on
Soviet ideology and behavior, drawing on my earlier Ph.D. dissertation and my
experience as a teacher of political theory. I discussed Marxism and Leninism,
dissecting the Soviet system and its violation of human rights. My staff was
immensely pleased, and one of them proudly told a Reuters correspondent that I
had written it myself the previous day. As a matter of fact, the idea of clearing it
with the State Department never entered my mind.
That afternoon in Washington, at the Department's daily briefing, the
Washington Reuter's correspondent, noting that my talk was the toughest he
had heard from anyone in our State Department, asked if my talk had been
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cleared. The spokesman, believing that all such statements had been cleared, said
that it was. The correspondent knew otherwise, and asked to see Roz Ridgeway,
the Counselor at State. Roz called me to learn what it was that I had said. I
explained, and said that the talk had been cabled to the Department immediately
following its delivery. After reading the talk, Roz called again to say that she
liked it very much. During the three years of our meeting, I was never asked by
the State Department to clear my remarks with them.
Following my first-day lunch with the Romanian in Madrid, he asked if I
would appear on Romanian television. I agreed and began the interview by
noting that both of my parents had been born in Romania in an area, I noted,
now "unfortunately" a part of the Soviet Union. A few days later, he told me his
President was excited about the interview and wanted me to visit with him in
Bucharest. What had I said? 1 was uncertain. He tracked it down to the word
"unfortunately." It was only after Washington asked me to go to Bucharest that
I met with President Nicolae Ceausescu for a rather long conversation about my
lineage and the potential threat to his country from massive numbers of Russian
troops on his border. Three years later, during the last week of our meeting, the
Romanian ambassador announced that President Ceausescu had instructed him
to support a disputed proposal by NATO, the first and only open breach in the
Warsaw Pact alliance.
V. THE FORMAL MEETINGS AND RELATED SUCCESSES
At the Madrid preparatory meeting, a divisive issue arose related to the
formal agenda to follow. At the meeting in my apartment with the Soviet
delegation, I suggested that we simply accept the inadequate Belgrade rules and
save our inevitable arguments until the real issues were discussed. The Soviets
declined, much to their later regret.
My staff, some of whom had been in Belgrade, recalled and provided me
with Warsaw Pact statements made then, which were completely contrary to
what the Warsaw Pact was now urging. At the appropriate time, I began the
potentially embarrassing contradictory disclosures, one of which included a
statement by the Hungarian ambassador, who sat across from me. As I spoke,
he was visibly uncomfortable. On the spur of the moment, I decided not to
mention his name. That evening, as I returned to my hotel after dinner, I found
a case of Hungarian wine, no card. The next morning I approached the
Hungarian very seriously and said that he had made life difficult for me.
Embarrassed, he expressed regret and wondered why. "We have a State
Department rule," I explained, "that we cannot accept any gifts that we cannot
consume within a matter of hours. It has been a very difficult night for me!"
Finally absorbing my comment, he burst into laughter. He proved to be a helpful
friend.

Spring 2003

Chicago Journal ofInternationalLaw

At one point, following a rather tough but detailed presentation by me at a
formal plenary session, as I walked along the corridor, a Warsaw Pact
ambassador walked beside me and asked for a copy of my presentation. He said
he wanted to send it to his seventeen-year-old son.
Early in our main meeting, the number three person in the Polish
delegation came to see me. He said he had been raised as a child by nuns at a
convent, who told him at the end of the war that he was Jewish and his parents
had been killed. He explained to me that, as a Jew, in spite of his excellent
training, he was unable to join the Polish Foreign Service, though he was now
pleased to have even a limited role. We became friends, and he is today an
internationally known authority on international affairs.
Shortly thereafter, his friend and classmate, the delegation deputy who was
part of the Foreign Service, came to see me with a problem. His wife and son
were quietly working with Solidarity and he was concerned about their safety
and his future. I made some suggestions and later some arrangements, including
a period of time in New York. When President Lech Walesa took over the
government, I wrote on my friend's behalf to the new Polish Foreign Minister,
whose release from prison I had urged in Madrid, vouching for my friend's
loyalty. My friend and colleague is today one of Poland's leading ambassadors.
Whenever I spoke at the Madrid plenary meetings, I arranged for a press
conference to follow at which I distributed the text of my talks. I began this
during the first week of our sessions. When the Soviet delegate became aware of
this practice, he took the floor to protest and to insist that I be silenced on the
grounds that I was violating the pattern of "confidentiality" which, he asserted,
was an integral part of the understanding among the participating states. I
immediately responded by asserting that I had not and did not intend to disclose
to the press what any other delegation was saying or doing at the plenary
sessions. I declared, however, that as a representative of a democracy, the
American people had a right to know what their representatives and diplomats
were doing and saying in their name. I understood why this would seem strange
to a representative of the Soviet Union. This ended the discussion and I noted
that about a week later the Soviet delegate began holding press sessions.
As we moved along, I gathered from the Soviets that they partially
attributed their inability to stop the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles
by NATO to the bad publicity they were receiving in Europe from the Madrid
meeting. I informed Secretary of State George Shultz and President Reagan of
my belief that the Soviets would give us all that we wanted in order to end the
meeting, but that I was no longer satisfied with asking only for words and not
deeds. I was authorized by the President to engage in quiet diplomacy on this
question, even though I knew it meant changing the rules in the middle of the
game.
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We were able, without publicity, to obtain the release of a few hundred
victims of Soviet repression, including all of the Pentecostals hiding in our
Embassy and their families in Siberia. My negotiation was with the KGB general.
Two years ago, he wrote a book about his experiences in Germany, where he
headed up the KGB prior to Madrid. The coauthor of the book was the man
who headed up the CIA in Germany during the same period. I have an
autographed copy of that volume with his inscription, which reads: "To my
friend Max Kampelman, who taught me the importance of democracy and
human rights."
After Madrid and the Cold War, I had the privilege of meeting Vaclav
Havel in his presidential office in Prague. He thanked me for championing his
cause and the cause of Charter 77, which he led. It was also most satisfying to
meet in Washington with Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek. He knew
that upon his arrest by the Communists, I had immediately spoken out about
him in Madrid-about his intellectual strengths, his commitment to human
values, and his service in Washington as a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson
Center when I served as its Chairman. What also impressed me immensely was
learning after Madrid that the Jewish and other human rights leaders imprisoned
in the Soviet Union would later refer to things I had said during the meetings,
saying in effect, "We in the prisons, we knew. Our friends had radios."
VI. SUCCESSES IN ACHIEVING UNPUBLICIZED OBJECTIVES

There were two other private, vital, and unpublicized assignments given to
me for Madrid. The first was the suggestion, not contained in any written
"instruction," that I try to be helpful in bringing Spain into NATO. Fortunately,
I quickly found that the Spanish ambassador to our meeting, Javier Ruperez,
Spain's current ambassador to Washington, strongly favored his country's entry
into NATO. I was able to persuade our NATO colleagues, as a matter of
courtesy to our host country, to permit the Spanish ambassador to join our
caucus, thereby making it a NATO plus one, or a Western caucus. Ruperez then
arranged for me to meet, on occasion, with his superiors, where we discussed
NATO. Shortly thereafter, Spain did join NATO and Ruperez became the
Spanish ambassador to NATO in Brussels.
A special highlight of the Madrid experience was the occasional
opportunity I had to meet privately with King Juan Carlos of Spain. Those
meetings were extraordinarily helpful to me as we discussed the Middle East,
other international affairs, NATO, the historic role of the Jews in Spain, and
Israel. The informality of the meetings was demonstrated, near the end of my
stay in Madrid, when the King told me he had a very good joke he wanted me to
pass along to President Reagan. I did.
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The second unwritten instruction was for me to help guide the official
Israeli CSCE observer. Israel was one of the "nonparticipating" Mediterranean
states that had a nonvoting relationship with the CSCE. Israel's representative
was Spanish speaking, having served Israel in Latin America. I introduced him to
many of our NATO colleagues. Associated with that task was the suggestion
that I be sensitive to our government's hope that Spain would enter into formal
diplomatic relations with Israel. That was eventually worked out, with the Israeli
CSCE observer later becoming Israel's first ambassador to Spain.
VII. CONCLUSION
As I close, I recall that during my early preparations for the Madrid CSCE
meeting, Ronald Reagan, as candidate for President, questioned whether we
should send our diplomats to Madrid given our decision, after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, not to send our athletes to Moscow for the Olympics.
As President of the United States, he and Secretary of State Shultz were
immensely supportive of what we were doing in Madrid. Indeed, it was
President Reagan who urged me to persuade the Soviets that they release Jews
and human rights advocates from their prisons and permit them to leave Russia
if Russia's relations with us were to improve.
Similarly, I had been urged by some friends not to accept the Madrid
assignment because the CSCE was an original Soviet proposal and the Soviets
did not intend to conform to its human rights provisions. Yet, I was later
awarded the Presidential Citizen's Medal by President Reagan and the
Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Clinton, in part for my role at the
Madrid meeting in promoting human rights through diplomacy. During a White
House event three years ago honoring the recipients of the Medal of Freedom,
former President Ford, also a recipient of the Medal of Freedom, approached
me to thank me. Back in 1975, President Ford was criticized even by many of his
friends when he made the United States a party to the CSCE by signing the
Helsinki Final Act. He thanked me for making him look good in history.
When I opened this article, I said it was not intended to be a primer for
aspiring diplomats. Nor is it a sermon designed to influence behavior. I trust that
it will, however, launch discussions of value in developing new insights, not the
least of which is my assertion that, as a registered Democrat who did not vote
for Ronald Reagan when he ran against Jimmy Carter, I consider my service to
President Reagan as having provided me with one of the greatest satisfactions of
my life. It has always been my view that the President of the United States,
Democrat or Republican, was my President, deserving of my respect and
support.
I have one final observation on the issue of food and diplomacy. My records
show that while in Madrid, I had more than 400 hours of private conversation
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with the Soviets, the details of which I shared with our NATO colleagues, and
practically all of it took place in private luncheons and dinners. In Geneva, private
luncheons and dinner talks with Soviets, without interpreters present, also lent
themselves to understanding and movement in our negotiations.
Secretary of State James Baker later asked me to return to the Helsinki
process for one-month sessions during each of 1991, 1992, and 1993. The 1991
meeting was in Moscow. Early in the month, I met the American manager of the
brand new McDonald's restaurant in Moscow. As the month came to a close, it
became our turn to host a diplomatic reception for the thirty-four other
delegations. I called my friend at McDonald's and persuaded him to rent me his
entire restaurant for an evening, to which I invited not only all thirty-four
ambassadors, but also all the secretaries, spouses, children, conference staff,
interpreters, and security personnel. More than three hundred people showed up
that evening with the complete typical McDonald's menu offered to them. We
also found a small Russian band that could play American music. It was a great
success. Diplomacy is, after all, a human event involving human beings.
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